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STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL FROM LIGHT WATER REACTORS
W. C. Wolkenhauer
Washington Public Power Supply System 
Richland, Washington
Abstract
The effects of possible inadequate nuclear fuel reprocessing capa­
bility upon a public utility, Washington Public Power Supply System, 
are studied. The possible alternatives for storing spent fuel are
reviewed.
1. INTRODUCTION
At present, there are no operating com­
mercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants 
in the U.S. Two plants are under con­
struction and/cr modification. According 
to present schedules, they would apparent­
ly be operating in time to receive spent 
fuel in the late 1970's. However, the 
owners of these plants are reluctant to 
contract for new business until such time 
as they better understand their costs, 
regulatory constraints, and construction 
schedules. Thus, it becomes necessary to 
examine the possible alternatives for 
storing spent fuel until reprocessing 
capability is available to nuclear electric 
utilities.
In this paper, the problem is examined 
from the standpoint of the Washington 
Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) nuclear 
plant construction and operation schedule. 
However, the analysis should be applicable 
to other possible utility systems. Some 
general conclusions are drawn which can be 
used to develop a general strategy leading 
to solutions to this problem.
2. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
By examining the fuel management plans and 
proposed operating schedules for the WPPSS 
nuclear power plants, it is possible to 
project the nominal rate of discharge of 
spent fuel from the WPPSS reactors. The 
incremental and integral fuel discharge 
for each of the reactors is given in 
Table 1 for the decade of the 1980's. In 
addition, accumulated totals are given by 
year for the tandem units (i.e. WNP-3 & 5 
and WNP-1 & 4).
In addition to the discharge schedule, the 
spent fuel storage capacity of the plants 
is needed in the analysis. WNP-2 has a 
nominal storage capacity of 1000 elements. 
WNP-1 and WNP-4 have storage capabilities 
of 288 elements each. WNP-3 and WNP-5 
have spent fuel storage capabilities of 
323 elements each. Typically, each spent 
fuel pool is designed to accommodate one 
full core plus an additional refueling 
batch, more or less. In the situation 
where refueling (and thus storage) is im­
perative, the requirement to be able to 
unload a full core at any time could be
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waived with the acceptance of some risk 
of forced shutdown.
Using the full capability of the spent 
fuel pool, the WNP-2 spent fuel pool as 
designed is filled to capacity in 1984. 
(Specifically, May 1 if present plans 
hold.) Similarly, the spent fuel pool of 
WNP-1 becomes full in 1984. The spent 
fuel of WNP-3 is full in 1985. The WNP-4 
spent fuel pool becomes full in 1986 and 
the WNP-5 fuel pool becomes full in 1987.
If the spent fuel pools of WNP-1 and WNP-4 
are taken together, the pool of the com­
bined facility is full in 1985. If WNP-3 
and WNP-5 are taken together, their com­
bined storage capacity is exhausted by 
1986 (i.e., September 1, 1986). The 
actual date for mandatory shutdown for 
each plant extends one cycle beyond the 
above dates.
Storage of fuel from WNP-2 in the storage 
pits of the other reactors and vice versa 
could not be accomplished without radical 
redesign of the spent fuel racks of the 
other reactors because of dimensional 
differences between BWR and PWR fuel.
Fuel storage between twin units is possi­
ble only if a fuel cask is available for 
the transfer and at some incremental risk 
of damage to the transported fuel 
assemblies.
The dimensions of the problem are clear. 
Assuming that spent fuel storage racks are 
incompatible for different fuel design 
types, and assuming that no reprocessing 
contract becomes available to the system, 
the capability to store WNP-2 fuel will be 
exhausted on May 1, 1984 and the total 
capability of the system as planned will 
be exhausted on September 1, 1986. Shut­
down of WNP-2 would be mandatory on May 1, 
1985 and the five planned reactors would 
be shut down on September 1, 1987.
In addition, the above dates assume that
full core storage will not be required for 
maintenance and repair to the plant.
There is a finite probability that shut­
down could come much earlier. If WNP-2 
were operated for its first two cycles and 
then be required to shut down during the 
third cycle for major maintenance requir­
ing core removal, a stalemate situation 
would be reached in that the reactor could 
neither be unloaded or operated. Thus, 
any time after August 1, 1981, the poten­
tial for WNP-2 shutdown exists in the 
absence of either a reprocessing contract 
or expanded storage capability.
This review summarizes the situation with 
regard to the WPPSS nuclear power plants. 
Most probably, a similar situation exists 
for most electrical generating utilities 
with nuclear power plants. Clearly, a 
substantial amount of nuclear fuel will be 
available for reprocessing in the 1980's.
3. THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL SITUATION
One of the factors in determining the 
viable options available to a nuclear 
utility in the event it cannot obtain a 
fuel reprocessing contract is the probable 
situation with regards to the rest of the 
nuclear power industry during the next 20 
years.
The national situation does not necessari­
ly dictate the action that a utility might 
take. Even in a time of reprocessing 
capacity shortage, some organizations will 
obtain a reprocessing contract (probably 
at premium rates). However, the more 
dismal the national situation, the smaller 
the chance becomes that a given utility 
will obtain a reprocessing contract. 
Therefore, this discussion is intended to 
give some context to and set the stage for 
a discussion of alternatives in the event 
that a utility does not obtain a repro­
cessing contract.
A number of predictions have been made of
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TABLE 1
Accumulation of Spent Fuel 
















































1981 164 69 332 69 69
1982 184 68 72 516 137 72 137 72
1983 184 68 80 69 700 205 152 69 274 152
1984 208 69 81 68 72 908 274 233 137 72 411 205
1985 216 68 80 68 80 1124 342 313 205 152 547 465
1986 212 68 84 69 81 1336 410 397 274 223 684 630
1987 212 69 85 68 80 1548 479 482 342 313 821 795
1988 212 68 84 68 84 1760 547 566 410 397 957 963
1989 212 68 84 69 85 1972 615 650 479 482 1094 1132
1990 212 69 85 68 84 2184 684 735 547 566 1231 1301
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the rate at which nuclear power will be 
introduced in this c o u n t r y I n  federal 
reports, these predictions are labeled A 
through D, ranging from C being the high­
est rate of introduction, then B, then D, 
and finally A as the lowest rate. These 
rates can be translated on a yearly basis 
into projected reprocessing loads. In 
this analysis, rates B (high intermediate) 
and D (low intermediate) are considered.
The national reprocessing load, in metric 
tons per year (MT/Y) for rates B and D is 
shown in Table 2. Additionally, there 
are a number of possible scenarios which 
can be defined which specify the rate at 
which reprocessing capability might be 
added in this country. A number of sce­
narios (labeled B through H) are defined 
during the course of this analysis. The 
specific scenarios used are listed in 
Table 3.
In table 3, scenario B is the currently 
anticipated rate at which reprocessing 
capacity will be added to the system. In 
the other scenarios, delays and cancella­
tions of Plants #2 (AGNS), #3 (NFS), and 
#4 (EXXON) are envisioned. Changes in the 
schedule (i.e., delays or cancellations) 
of Plants #5 and beyond are not of interest 
to this analysis as we wish to assess the 
situation in the 1980's. Additionally, 
adding capacity beyond that now planned 
seems unrealistic for the time period 
1975-1983, as it apparently takes about 
as long to build and license a reprocess­
ing contract as it does a reactor.
Considering first the nuclear plant start­
up Schedule D (assumes some delays from 
the 1974 nominal), Figure 1 displays the 
quantity of spent fuel which must be 
stored in any given year from 1974 to 
1994 for the present planned situation 
(scenario B), delay of Plant #3 (NFS) by 
two years (scenario D), and cancellation 
of Plant #3 (scenario C). If the nominal
situation comes true, a utility with 
plants coming on line in the 1980's will 
not be affected materially as the problem 
is solved by 1983. If the NFS Plant is 
delayed two years, a national storage 
problem exists until 1987 and if the NFS 
Plant is cancelled, a national problem 
exists until 1994.
Figure 2 displays the impact of delay or 
cancellation of Plant #2 (AGNS). Delay of 
AGNS for two years results in extension of 
the storage problem to 1987, just as in 
delay of the NFS plant, but the fuel 
storage requirements are somewhat larger 
(i.e., a peak of 4650 MT vs. 3450 MT). 
Cancellation of AGNS creates a major 
national storage problem of up to 14100 MT 
of spent fuel until the year 1997.
Figure 3 shows the effect of delay or loss 
of Plant #4 (scheduled to start up in 1983) 
on the requirement for storage of spent 
fuel. Because this plant comes into the 
system later, its impact is felt later.
A delay of two years results in a re­
quirement for storage out to the year 1990 
with a storage peak of 5200 MT in 1984.
Loss of the 1983 plant results in a re­
quirement for storage until the year 2000 
with a required storage peak of 21600 MT 
in 1992.
In order to estimate the effect of delays 
or speedup of nuclear power plant con­
struction on the nominal spent fuel 
storage requirements, the storage re­
quirements for scenario B (nominal) are 
shown in Figure 4 for two nuclear power 
plant construction schedules (B - high 
intermediate and D - low intermediate).
The major effect of changing the initial 
nuclear power plant construction schedule 
on spent fuel storage requirements, given 
the present planned reprocessing plant 
construction schedule, seems to vary the 
peak requirements for storage (i.e., 3300 
MT for Schedule B vs. 2500 MT for Schedule
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Plant No. Owner Capacity (MT/Y)
1 General Electric (GE) 300
2 Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS) 1500









No. B C D E F G H
1 (GE)
2 (AGNS) 1978 1978 1978 1978 1978 1980
—
3 (NFS) 1978 — 1980 1978 1978 1978 1978
4 (EXXON) 1983 1983 1983 1985 _______ 1983 1983
5 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987 1987
6 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
7 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
8 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997
9 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
* Most Propable Owner (Not Announced)
---  Plant Cancel!ed
----  Change from Nominal
327
f f.7* f, tw— if . • i. . * •.. v:‘ r! * V f /r># a* «; *j n r. t *r] V> / - . l;" Si .*••«.-» U























v Cui:l.i i c? ::?s
2 Y££B3)
\








psr M i .
76  . 77  73 79



































2 |f£g€T m  IL8SS 0 3  M lZ iY  ftg A"-n5
1 S . 0 0 0 -
1 6 , 0 0 0 -
o
14,000*




4 0 0 0 -
2000-
r:7 4 76  7 3 5 0  32  34  36  88 9 0  92. 9 4  96 98 2 0 0 0  Ci
AT Y r . t \ k  r-r.(D
329
C). The peak year is still 1977 and the 
problem persists to some extent through 
1983 independent of the nuclear power 
plant construction schedule.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from 
this analysis of the national situation. 
They are:
(1) If the nominal schedule for fu­
ture reprocessing capacity additions holds, 
there will be sufficient reprocessing 
capability for the nation beyond 1983.
(2) Any deviation from the nominal 
schedule could result in the need for a 
utility to expand, build or lease storage 
space for several years, starting in 1983. 
Certainly, the likelihood of a utility 
obtaining a contract for reprocessing 
services would be greatly decreased.
(3) Changes in the construction 
schedule for nuclear power plants are not 
likely to affect the above conclusions.
(4) The spent fuel surplus in the 
1980's cannot be materially changed by 
adding an additional reprocessing plant 
unless it can be built before 1983 (which 
is extremely unlikely).
(5) If storage facilities are built, 
a minimum payoff period of five years 
seems justified, based on the length of 
likely periods of a national deficit in 
reprocessing capability.
In addition to the above conclusions, a 
key question that must be considered is 
the likelihood that Plant #4 (Exxon) will 
be available in 1983. This plant has not 
as yet been announced. A review of Figure 
3 shows that a nominal delay of this plant 
would assure a captive reprocessing market 
whereas introduction in 1983 results in a 
slight industry surplus of reprocessing 
capacity. Conversely, a captive market 
could result in utilities building storage 
facilities. Once built, they would be 
integrated into fuel management plans so 
that utilities might tend to delay re­
processing in order to achieve (hopefully) 
cheaper reprocessing rates.
To analyze this question, Figure 5 dis­
plays the results of the nominal schedule 
(scenario B) with and without Plant #1 
(G.E.). The latter curve represents the 
situation which existed when the present 
plants were committed. This curve shows 
that cancellation of Plant #1 did not 
materially affect the present situation. 
Additionally, it shows that the reprocess­
ing industry was slow in planning additions 
compared to demand. This could be attri­
buted to lack of anticipation in the 1960's 
of nuclear growth in the 1970's,or it 
could be construed as delay in order to be 
assured of a market. In any case, based 
on the present and past conditions, delay 
of the 1983 plant for business reasons 
does not seem unrealistic.
In summary, the present situation is not 
catastrophic with regard to nuclear utili­
ties. However, a utility should be re­
viewing its options in the event of delays 
of Plants #2 (AGNS), #3 (NFS) and #4 
(1983) and should exercise one or more of 
these options if any delays seem likely.
4. CONSTRUCTION OF SEPARATE
SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES
With regard to construction of separate 
spent fuel storage facilities, the USAEC 
apparently considers this a probable 
short-term reality. The USAEC has recent­
ly issued Regulatory Guide 3.24, "Guidance 
on the License Application, Siting, Design 
and Plant Protection for an Independent 
Spent Fuel Storage Installation" (December 
1974). The licensing procedure is similar 
to that for a nuclear power plant. The 
installation is conceived of having a 
minimum capacity of 1000 metric tons (MT) 
of spent fuel (3200 BWR elements). A 
typical nuclear power plant discharges 
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A 1000 MT storage facility with a 15-year 
payoff has been estimated to cost 20 
million dollars. Assuming linearity, a 
3000 MT storage facility would then cost 
60 million dollars. Assuming an interest 
rate of 6%, this would result in an aver­
age storage charge based on capital return 
of $4,500 per MT per year. The cost would 
be lower if it were filled faster. This 
rate reflects the fact that the facility 
is partially empty for most of its life.
At an interest rate of 14%, the average 
storage charge based on capital return 
would be $7,500 per MT per year. I arbi­
trarily assume a value of $1,000 per MT 
per year for facility operating costs. If 
this is the case, at an interest rate of 
6%, the storage charge would be $5,500 
per MT per year and at an interest rate of 
14%, the storage charge would be $8,500 
per MT per year. In addition to the above 
storage charges, there would be a trans­
portation charge per metric ton of fuel 
which accrue to that fuel which must be 
shipped to the storage facility. I esti­
mate this cost to be $8,800 per M T  with no 
escalation for at least one typical situa­
tion. The average cost with escalation 
would be $12,300 per metric ton. Con­
sidering the total storage bill for the 
15-year time period, the transportation 
charge is small in comparison.
5. LEASE/STORAGE
Renting of storage space for spent fuel 
may prove to be attractive. Factors 
which need to be evaluated include possi­
ble high incremental transportation costs, 
possible high rental charges due to in­
centives for early cost recovery on the 
part of entrepreneurs, and questions of 
ultimate responsibility.
General Electric Company has proposed 
construction of a separate $25,000,000 
storage facility in addition to expansion 
of the storage capacity of its Morris,
Illinois, installation. In addition, E. R. 
Johnson Company, in collaboration with 
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, 
Inc., has proposed construction of a 1000 
MT storage facility. This facility is 
estimated to cost 20 million dollars.
Space would rent in this facility at the
rate of $10,000 per MT per year. The lo-
( 2 )cation of the facility is unspecified.
The sponsors justify this charge by 
asserting that the equivalent cost of 
storing the plutonium contained in a MT of 
spent LWR fuel would amount to $20,000 per 
MT of spent fuel if the plutonium were 
separated during reprocessing and not re­
cycled but stored.
There are approximately 10 reactors which 
could utilize this facility immediately. 
Assuming a discharge of 30 MT per reactor 
per year means that 10 reactors would fill 
this facility in three years. Assuming a 
design life of 15 years for the facility 
and assuming that it fills at the above 
rate, the rental charge amounts to a return 
on capital excess of 35%, if the operating 
cost is taken as $1,000 per MT per year. 
Viewed another way, assuming an interest 
charge of 14%, this facility would be paid 
for in less than five years with the 
storage charge of $10,000 per ton per year. 
If the facility were filled as soon as 
completed, the facility would be paid for 
in about three years with this storage 
charge. Assuming that this facility could 
be built by 1980 but not before, a five- 
year payoff period is generally consistent 
with the present situation (Figure 1- 
Scenario B). Any delays would result in 
substantial profit to the owners.
As with owned storage space, there would 
be a transportation charge associated with 
shipment of the fuel to the storage 
facility. I assume that the transportation 
distance would be 2,000 miles and therefore 
I assign a transportation charge of $50,000
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per metric ton to the fuel. If the storage 
facility were located near an eventual 
fuel reprocessing facility, this trans­
portation charge could then be pro-rated, 
on some basis, to both storage and re­
processing.
6. IMPACT OF DELAYED REPROCESSING 
ON NUCLEAR FUEL COSTS
The calculations in this analysis were
performed with the Hanford Fuel Cost (HFC)
(3)code developed by Omberg. The calculations 
were performed using the WNP-2 reactor 
characteristics as input. A twenty-four 
cycle calculation was performed in order 
to assure that the reactor was on an 
equilibrium fuel cycle. In general, un­
less noted otherwise, a 6% interest rate 
was used in the analysis.
During the course of performing the analy­
sis, two significant changes were made to 
the code by D. H. Thomsen. One change 
delayed reprocessing until a date which is 
specified as input. At this date, all 
fuel which has been delayed is reprocessed 
and credited to the appropriate batch 
(weighted by a present worth factor).
Fuel discharged after this date is re­
processed in the normal manner. The 
second change allowed for input of a fuel 
storage charge (in $/Kg U) for the fuel 
which was delayed.
The first step in the analysis was to 
calculate the impact of the reprocessing 
delay alone on fuel cycle costs without 
computing the accompanying cost of fuel 
storage. The major costs of delaying 
reprocessing are the costs of additional 
fuel and storage of the spent fuel. By 
separating these costs, it is possible to 
identify the important cost parameters in 
the problem.
Figure 6 shows the levelized fuel cost 
for WNP-2 as a function of reprocessing 
delay. The costs reflect the additional
fuel which must be purchased but do not, 
in this figure, reflect the storage costs.
Figure 6 starts with a base case (no re­
processing delay) fuel cost of 3.53 mills/ 
kwh. The fuel cost drops slightly before 
rising to a maximum of 3.55 mills/kwh in 
1990. From 1990 until 2000, the fuel cost 
drops rapidly to 3.34 mills/kwh. No analy­
sis was performed for the years beyond 
2000. The relatively rapid drop in fuel 
costs beyond 1990 is attributed to the 
predicted cost structure used in this 
analysis. As noted on Figure 6, the cost 
of enrichment used in this analysis peaks 
in 1987 and then drops substantially over 
the period of interest. Fuel fabrication 
and uranium costs continue to rise over 
the total period. The plutonium price 
escalates until the year 2000 and is 
assumed stable beyond 2000. Thus, this 
curve shows that, for the price and parti­
cularly the enrichment price structure 
shown, it is cheaper to store fuel and buy 
extra enrichment than it is to reprocess 
the fuel if the price of storage is zero.
It has been shown that the drop in fuel 
cost curve caused by a reprocessing delay 
is temporary. Delaying reprocessing 
essentially forever results in a fuel cost 
of 4.32 mills/kwh.
To obtain perspective, the base case was 
run at 12% interest rather than 6% interest. 
The resulting levelized fuel cost was 3.76 
mills/kwh. Thus, changes in interest rate 
overshadow all the fuel cost changes shown 
in Figure 6.
In this portion of the analysis, the pre­
vious calculations were performed with the 
addition of a cost for storage of the fuel. 
Costs were used which reflect the cost, 
both in WPPSS-owned facilities and rental 
of storage space in facilities owned by 
others. Specifically, a charge of $5,500 
per metric of fuel ton per year of fuel
335
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was used for WPPSS-owned facilities and a 
charge of $10,000 per metric ton of fuel 
per year was used for rented facilities.
Figure 7 shows the levelized fuel cost for 
24 cygles for WNP-2 as a function of re­
processing delay assuming a storage charge 
of $5,500 per metric ton of fuel per year.
Comparing Figure 7 to Figure 6 shows that 
the cost of storing the spent fuel is the 
major cost item in delaying reprocessing. 
In Figure 7, the fuel cost peak at 1990 is 
located at the same time point as in 
Figure 6, but the peak is higher (3.61 
mills/kwh as 3.55 mills/kwh) and the 
minimum in the year 2000 is 3.49 mills/kwh 
rather than 3.34 mills/kwh as in Figure 6. 
A study of Figure 7 also indicates that if 
fuel is to be stored, it is advantageous 
to store it for a considerable length of 
time (i.e., beyond 1990). This is probab­
ly due mostly to the enrichment price 
structure described previously. Another 
conclusion that can be tentatively drawn 
from Figure 7 is that the decision on 
whether or not to store fuel will pro­
bably be made on the basis of other para­
meters than fuel costs as the variations 
shown in Figure 7 are probably within 
current calculational uncertainties and, 
in any case, are considerably overshadowed 
by such parameters as the interest rate.
7. SUMMARY
It has been shown that there is a strong 
possibility that utilities will be forced 
to delay reprocessing of spent fuel from 
their nuclear power plants due to a short­
fall in reprocessing industry capacity 
which is likely to exist well into the 
1980's. In this analysis, some prelimi­
nary calculations have been done to assess 
the impact of this delay on nuclear fuel 
costs. The specific calculations were 
performed on the WNP-2 nuclear power 
plant but the conclusions drawn from the
results are expected to be generally 
applicable to other nuclear power plants.
On the basis of this analysis, a number of 
conclusions have been drawn. They are:
(1) The major change in the fuel cost 
which results from delay in reprocessing 
spent nuclear fuel is the cost of storing 
the spent fuel.
(2) The cost of additional uranium 
and enrichment requirements is not 
substantial.
(3) For the specific reactor analyzed 
the levelized fuel costs rise if a short 
storage period is used, but ultimately 
decrease with long-term (i.e., 10 years) 
storage. Therefore, if reprocessing is 
delayed, storage of spent fuel for time 
periods greater than 10 years is preferred
(4) The changes in levelized fuel 
costs due to storage are small compared to 
other uncertainties. Under certain condi­
tions, a small decrease in levelized fuel 
costs can be realized by temporary storage 
of spent nuclear fuel.
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